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was a deterrent to burglars who, posing as canvassers, could ascertain
whether the house was empty. The Supreme Court held that this
manner of distribution of literature outweighed by far the nuisances
which might result.16  Some means of identification can be required
of a stranger, in order to establish his character, authority and pur-
pose.'7 The decision to exclude canvassers should rest with the
homeowner alone, and not with the city-unless, of course, the
individual specifically requests the city to take over his right of
exclusion. There is no criterion by which to measure what is a
reasonable restriction, and what is not. Each case rests on its own
individual facts. In the long view, the Supreme Court is guided
in its decisions by the belief that the right to disseminate religious
literature freely is essential to the spiritual guidance and high moral
standards of the itizens of a democracy.' 8
P. S. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOCAL LAW PROHIBITING ITINERANT
PEDDLING ON STREETS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-The plaintiff who is
engaged in the business of selling ice-cream to consumers in the
streets from refrigerated motor cars, tricycles and hand carts, seeks
to enjoin the city of New York from enforcing an ordinance ' which
prohibits itinerant peddling except in enumerated circumstances. The
plaintiff contended that the law was unconstitutional inasmuch as it
was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Sections 1, 6 and 11 of the New York
16 See note 15 supra. Accord, Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162,
60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. ed. 155 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496.
17 See note 11 supra.
18 Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U. S. 296, 310, 60 Sup. Ct 900, 84 L. ed. 1213,
128 A. L. R. 1352.
1 N. Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 435--14.0. Itinerant peddling prohibited. a. It
shall be unlawful for any person to peddle, hawk, vend or sell any goods, wares
or merchandise on any of the streets of the city. b. The provisions of this
section shall not apply to: 1. Any person who operates and maintains a push-
cart or other vehicle under an open air market license issued by the commis-
sioner of public markets pursuant to the agriculture and markets law; or
to -2. Any war veteran or any widow of a war veteran who peddles under a
license issued pursuant to section thirty-two of the General Business Law;
or to- 3. Any adult blind person who operated under a license issued pursuant
to section ten of the General City Law or by the commissioner of markets
pursuant to section B36-89.0 of the code; or to-4. Any 'person who sells
newspapers and periodicals; or to-5. Any person who owns and operates a
farm in the city and who sells produce grown on such farm in the streets of
the city; 6. Any person who violates this section, upon conviction thereof, shall




Constitution.2  The city of New York maintained that the Local
Law was adopted pursuant to powers conferred on the City Charter,
and that the power over streets which the Charter has conferred oh
the City Council is such a power as the City Home Rule Law in-
tended municipal legislative bodies to possess.3 From a judgment
of the Appellate Division unanimously affirming a judgment of the
trial court which had granted an injunction to the plaintiff and had
declared the statute unconstitutional, defendant appealed. Held, judg-
ment affirmed. Where not all peddling is subject to criticism, and
discrimination is not impractical, prohibition rather than regulation
is not justified. Good Hunor Corporation v. City of New York, 290
N. Y. 312, 49 N. E. (2d) 153 (1943).
Generally, business and occupations are subject to regulation
under the police power,4 but such regulation must not be unreason-
able or arbitrary. It appears that the Local Law failed to meet
these qualifications. The object of the law, as stated by the Com-
mittee on General Welfare of the New York City Council, was "to
prevent unfair competition by itinerant peddlers with storekeepers
who pay rent and various taxes, and it is in the interest of prosperity
of the City and its inhabitants." However, the majority of the court
did not deem this object to be broad enough to prohibit for the sole
purpose stated, the use of the streets for a lawful business recognized
by statute. Courts have repeatedly declared peddling to be a legiti-
mate business. 6 The city of New York alleged various harmful con-
ditions which are the results of peddling in the streets of New York.
Among the harmful conditions were the facts that some peddlers
were not clean in their personal habits, some used fraudulent scales
and measures, some offer their merchandise for sale in an unsanitary
manner, and that in some crowded streets and especially at approaches
to bridges, peddlers and peddlers' carts impede traffic. The plaintiff
showed, and the city conceded, that the Good Humor Corporation
conducted its business without any of the above mentioned evil prac-
tices. The court maintained that the harmful conditions in question
could be dealt with by a rigid enforcement of ordinances and sanitary
regulations, moreover it felt that a prohibition of peddling was un-
2 N. Y. CoxsT. Art. I, § 1. No member of this state shall be disfran-
chised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen
thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
§ 6-No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
§ 11-No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof ....
3 City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429, 165 N. E. 836
(1929).
4 Cowan v. City of Buffalo, 247 App. Div. 591, 288 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1936).
5 See 16 C. J. S. 556, § 188.
6 Village of Stanford v. Fischer, 140 N. Y. 187, 35 N. E. 500 (1893);
Collender v. Reardon, 138 App. Div. 738, 123 N. Y. Supp. 587 (1910) ; City of
Buffalo v. Linsman, 113 App. Div. 584, 98 N. Y. Supp. 737 (1906) ; Robinson
v. Wood, 119 Misc. 299, 196 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1922).
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reasonable, especially inasmuch as it did not appear that discrimina-
tion between the peddling which was useful, and that which was
harmful, was impractical. In so holding, the Court of Appeals has
extended the doctrine that peddling, unless it constitute an interference
with traffic, 7 cannot be prohibited by a municipal ordinance. It has
been held that a city cannot by ordinance prohibit peddling in certain
sections thereof when conditions in the restricted section are not
dissimilar from those existing in many other areas and where the
ordinance bears no relation to the welfare of the public but is designed
for the convenience and interest of a special class.8 Hawking and
peddling have long been subject to regulation.9 As such, the city
of New York had the right to impose reasonable and just regulations,
but did not have the right to impose a broad prohibition on a legiti-
mate business. Moreover, the city of New York did not have the
power to prohibit peddling as an incidental right of its power over
the use of the streets granted it by the Home Rule Law, Section 11.
Three justices in a dissenting opinion written by Finch, J., con-
tended that the Local Law was a reasonable regulation of a purely
local problem and therefore constitutional. The minority view was
that the Local Law did not force the peddlers and hawkers to abandon
their trade but rather to confine themselves to the public markets
where adequate facilities had been provided.' The use of the facilities
in the public market would result in proper supervision both as to
the safeguarding of food and as to short weighting and other problems
which at present are difficult to enforce. The decision in the prin-
cipal case is an affirmation of the rule that peddling is a legitimate
business and is subject to regulation but not prohibition.
T.K.
INSURANCE-TRUST AGREEMENTS-USE OF ACCUMULATION
PRIOR TO AGREED TIME.-Widowed mother of three children seeks
to have an alleged trust agreement set aside, so that interest being
accumulated for three minor children may be used to pay for the
children's education. Petitioner's husband was insured by five life-
insurance companies. By the terms of the policies, the benefits
accruing on the death of the insured would be divided equally among
decedent's three minor children. The rights of the beneficiaries were
7 Bus Depot Holding Corp. v. Valentine, 288 N. Y. 115, 41 N. E. (2d)
913 (1942).
8 People v. Cohen, 272 N. Y. 319, 5 N. E. (2d) 835 (1936) ; People v.
Klinge, 276 N. Y. 292, 12 N. E. (2d) 161 (1938).
9 N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 26, § 20, subd. 13. Subject to the constitution and
general laws of this state, every city is empowered to maintain order, enforce
the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort
and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for
any of said purposes to regulate and license occupations and businesses.
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